"Daring ideas are like chessmen
moved forward;
they may be beaten, but they may start a winning game."
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
(1749-1832)
"What a man believes may be
ascertained, not from his creed,
but from the assumptions on which he habitually acts."
George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950)
Philosophy is essentially
about the questioning of assumptions, those axioms that form the starting point
for any mathematical or scientific perspective. The various fields that
comprise the complexity sciences utilise a set of axioms that differs in many
ways from those used in conventional science. Here we will introduce our take
on the ideas that comprise this new viewpoint or 'paradigm' and contrast them
with traditional views, in a way that emphasises the value of this new
thinking. We will also try to pull together our series of thematic introductions into an integrated whole. The complexity viewpoint is not however
restricted to scientific areas and can usefully be employed in considering many
personal and social situations where complex interactions and difficult
decisions need to be evaluated.
Many of our philosophical
ideas are not made explicit in our education, but develop unconsciously as we
grow and as we absorb our social and intellectual environments. We have a
considerable bias towards simplification and in many situations will reduce a
complex multidimensional issue to a one-dimensional form more conducive to an
either/or decision. Complexity thinking looks to recognising the situations
where this is invalid and to providing an alternative form of treatment that
can better deal with these problems - the philosophy of complexity. This
combines, in our view, three strands of thought, systems thinking
(incorporating cybernetics) which relates to non-specific systems, organic
thinking (including evolution) relating to non-static systems, and connectionist
thinking (attractor based) relating to non-reductionism. Let us consider each
in turn. See the glossary for any unfamiliar terms.
The term 'system' is used
in many ways, for example in solar system, social system, ecosystem, hi-fi
system and so on. All these uses relate to groups of related entities. Systems
thinking is an interdisciplinary field that looks to find common properties
across all these forms of organization, and therefore studies generalised or
abstract systems, rather than the more conventional specific forms. Normally we
associate the idea with cybernetics, a type of system that incorporates feedback,
causal loops that force nonlinear behaviours, and which develops
homeostasis or constancy in system space. These sort of systems are
self-contained and self-regulatory, we cannot look at the parts in isolation
but must consider the overall (holistic) purpose of the system. This relates to
emergence, the generation of new higher level system
properties that contain functions that do not exist in any of the parts.
Organic systems have a
metabolism, they are both self-producing (they manufacture their own parts,
unlike artificial systems) and self-maintaining (self-repair is possible). We
can illustrate an organic system by the following biological picture:

They are often called autopoietic systems. They are responsive to their
environment, but unlike general cybernetic systems are also adaptive,
discovering new behaviours over time - they are innovative. This relates to
associative learning and over a longer evolutionary
period to genetic algorithms where coevolution amongst large
populations by natural selection plays a part. In these systems part
interactions are often stochastic or indeterminate, and control is distributed
not centralised, again differing from more conventional systems.
The idea of connectionism
is derived from artificial neural networks in cognitive science, where
inter-unit wiring is both explicit and brain like, and employs a distributed
data structure. But we can generalise this idea also to cases where the
connections use adjacency (cellular automata), logic (boolean networks), information (cas) and sensors (artificial life). These systems all self-organize and that is one of the defining features of
connectionist systems, the connections allow information to communicate across
the system and the system closure (feedback loops) then causes attractors
to form. How the connectivity is arranged is crucial to the style of system
obtained since the system is defined by the connections and not by the parts
(as in reductionism). This permits static, chaotic and organized modes of
operation, along with more complex dynamical systems exhibiting mixtures of
these modes.
Putting these three strands
together we arrive at our prototype complex system (the divisions outlined
above are somewhat arbitrary and many ideas appear historically in more than one
of these viewpoints, we have not attempted to be definitive here). The effects
of the various features mentioned creates what we call a Type 4 self-organizing complex system, which is based
upon the following assumptions that differ from those adopted in conventional
scientific work (note however that different complexity researchers may include
different sets of axioms, and may also define them differently - this is still
a very tentative and provisional list):
Complex systems are
generally composed of independent or autonomous agents (not the identical parts
often assumed in science). All of these agents are regarded as equally valuable
in the operation of the system (there is initially an anarchic power symmetry).
No executive or directing node exists (by design) in these systems, which gives
an absence of central or external control. Therefore any control structure or
leadership (a power asymmetry) must emerge by self-organisation and cannot be imposed.
Complex system outputs are
not proportional to their inputs. This means that reductionist superposition -
the idea that F(x+y) = F(x) + F(y) and that F(ax) = aF(x) - does not hold in
this nonlinear science. Thus taking the properties of each
part and adding them will not give a valid solution to overall fitness - the
whole is different than the sum of the parts. Mutual interference (epistasis)
between the parts requires that we analyse the system in an holistic way.
The system properties are
thus not describable in terms of their parts, they are emergent or
higher level functions of the system. These functions or properties will not
even be describable using the language applicable to the parts only, and are
what have been called 'Meta-System Transitions' or evolutionary transitions. They
comprise forms of synergy or cooperation that go beyond the simple ideas
of aggregation used in reductionist science (and disprove the Laplacean
deterministic fallacy that claimed that all system behaviour is predictable
from total part data).
Along with the traditional
form of upward causation (the parts creating the whole) we have in complex
systems a downward form also. This means that the existence and properties of
the parts themselves are affected by the emergent properties (or higher level
systemic features) of the whole, which form constraints
or boundary conditions on the freedom of the constituents. For example, we, as
humans, determine (by our actions) the fate of our cells just as much as their
function determines us, and this two way structural interplay is common in
complex systems.
Self-organization relates
to the presence in the system of dynamical attractors.
Each attractor will occupy a relatively small area of overall state space. The
system will thus be expected to contain multiple alternative attractors (areas
of stable operation - concurrent options or 'choices'), giving several
different possible behaviours for the same system. Which actually occurs will
depend upon both the initial configuration and the subsequent perturbations and transients (the system history). This compares to
conventional science where history is discarded.
The distribution of choices
or optima around state space can be modelled by the concept of a fitness landscape. Here the height of the hills
relates to how good the option is (this landscape is contextually dependent).
Unlike conventional ideas, we are looking here at all the possibilities open to
the system and not just the current actuality.
The parts are regarded as
evolving in conjunction with each other in order to fit into a wider system
environment, thus fitness must be measured in contextual terms as a dynamic
fitness for the current niche, and not in relation to any imposed static
function. The part structure will correlate to an external environment (giving
a contextual fitness by structural coupling). This dependence upon environment
contrasts with the isolated treatments of conventional science.
These systems operate far
from equilibrium since they are dissipative (i.e. they take energy from their
environment to maintain the far-from-equilibrium position). Energy flows will
drive the system away from an equilibrium position and establish semi-stable
modes as dynamic attractors. This relates to the metabolic self-sustaining
activity which in living systems is usually called autopoiesis. These active systems reduce local entropy
whilst exporting it to the environment, unlike conventional passive systems.
Complex systems contain
structures in space and time (thus are heterogeneous rather than the
homogeneous assumption from conventional science). Their part freedoms will
allow varying associations or movement, permitting clumping and changes over
time, thus initially homogenous systems will develop self-organizing structures dynamically (therefore order increases over time rather than
decreasing as expected in conventional thought).
These parts are
non-equivalent (thus each can obey different rules or local laws - rather than
all behaving the same under the global laws of conventional science). Each part
evolves separately, giving a diversity in rule or task space. The mix of rules
(learning) that occurs will depend upon the system's overall contextual coevolution.
Feedback processes lead to
phase changes, sudden jumps in system properties. These 'edge of chaos' states are critical points in connectivity terms and the system is
maintained at the phase boundary by its self-organising dynamics - very
different than the either/or phases of conventional systems. At this point a
power law distribution of properties and perturbations occurs in both space and
time. These systems exhibit the self-similarity of fractals,
but in a statistical rather than an exact way.
In such interacting systems
a chaotic sensitivity to initial conditions can occur
(the butterfly effect). Trajectories differ, some show this divergence in state
space from nominally similar inputs, others show convergence to an attractor.
This is a feature of the mix of attractors typically present at that point
(unlike the single attractor of equilibrium dynamics).
Over the long term stepped
evolution or catastrophes will exist (similar to punctuated equilibria). Sudden
swaps between attractors become possible as the system parameters approach the boundaries
of the attractors. Evolution thus is expected to operate in steps rather than
gradually, with the wild swings in coevolutionary balance often associated with
perturbations to ecosystems being seen. The steady state
models of conventional science are rather different.
Random internal changes
(mutations) or innovations typically occur in these systems. New configurations
become possible due to part creation, destruction or modification. This relates
to changes to the structure of state space, which must be regarded as dynamic, not static and does not conserve world lines
as in conventional science, here they may bifurcate and merge over time.
Usually these systems have
an ability to clone identical or edited copies (growth). Even social systems
can replicate to create additional systems (e.g. organizations or franchises).
Copying errors (including mutations, recombination or insertion) permit new
system structures to become available, allowing open ended evolution and
self-generation (autocatalysis). This discards the fixed-in-time
assumption of most science.
Parts can change their
associations or connectivity freely - either randomly or by evolved learning
procedures. Thus the system can be regarded as redesigning itself over time, as
far as proves necessary to maintain or change function within its operating
context. These internally generated system changes are missing from most
scientific viewpoints, which assume instructional changes.
The meaning of the system's
interface with the environment is not initially specified and this must evolve.
This requires that semantic values or communications are created dynamically
(or constructed) by the system as a result of environmental
interaction and are not simply a direct reflection (mapping) of the external
world (as usually assumed). This is a contextual (constructivist) semantics
rather than an absolute view of external truth.
The overall system function
is thus not initially known, but is created by coevolutionary methods. This
relates to combinations of the emergent values creating an implicit theory of operation,
in which sharp dualist classifications are unavailable and probabilistic
matching between system and environment must suffice. This is a fuzzy functionality very different to standard bivalent
logic.
We can summarise the
structure of complex systems in an overall heterarchical view where
successively higher levels show a many to many (N:M) structure, rather than the
top down (1:N) tree structure common to conventional thought.

Here the 'part'
interactions will create emergent 'modules' with new properties. These modules
themselves interact as parts at an higher level and this process leads to the
creation of an emergent hierarchical 'system' (the upward causation). The
components at each level also connect horizontally to form an heterarchy - an
evolving web like network of associations which generates the autocatalysis or
self-production aspect of the system. Additionally systems can have overlapping
members at each level (e.g. individuals can belong to many social groups,
molecules to many substances, a situation to many models and a model to many
situations). These groups of interlaced networks are coevolutionarily
constrained by downward causalities.
This extended design we
call here an heterarchical hyperstructure (to reflect the flexible
inter-relationships between levels typical of human systems). We could also
call this three dimensional structure a CAS cube
(intrasystem, interlevel, intersystem) or a triple network. Natural
hyperstructures typically will have thousands of components and connections per
system, rather than the few shown here for illustration, and generally
therefore complex systems are very high dimensional. Given that a metasystem
(the set of systems) has such a set of structures, then the overall fitness of
any part will relate to the interdependent properties at all levels, in other
words to the full contextual environment.
Despite the apparent
differences between complexity thinking and conventional science, what we have
here is a superset concept of science and life, which includes many areas
left out of conventional treatments. The conventional positions can be restored
by forcing global constraints (axioms) back onto system space, thus reducing
the scope of the systems studied towards either the static (Newtonian) or
chaotic (statistical) ends of the scientific continuum.
These techniques can be used in other areas also, for example in production systems which mix expert system and cognitive learning
techniques to form classifiers.
Possible applications of complexity thought pervade all our human
areas, and in this respect we are considering agents that are aware and goal
driven in some sense. This awareness has arisen biologically, and this
developmental aspect of complexity brings in evolutionary psychology and L-systems. The main 'aware' characteristics of the type 4 complex systems often studied we consider to be:
Breaking away from the
constraints of old-style scientific axioms (which nethertheless remain valid
within their limited domains) allows us to explore an organic world that until
now has been difficult to understand in overall terms. In such high-dimensional
(multivalued) systems reductionist thinking proves inadequate, isolated single
dimensional results do not predict real system behaviours. The coevolutionary
or epistatic nature of interrelated systems requires us to take a contextual
approach, studying the dynamics of interactions rather than the static makeup
of parts studied in more conventional science.
Contextual approaches
recognise that systems do not exist in isolation, but are defined only in
conjunction with other systems (including that of the observer). This coevolutionary nature of multiple
systems brings us to an ecosystem viewpoint and allows us to understand the
irregular changes over time that characterise such systems. This viewpoint is
not emphasised in the assumptions of our conventional sciences, which are based
on static snapshots of what are non-static systems. In complex systems
solutions are always compromises, there is no single answer. What we
must do instead is to compare alternative answers or options in state space,
using a plurality of techniques, with a view to identifying the most fit, the
global optimum in the context of interest.